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1. Introduction 38 
In Spain, tourism accounts for 12% of GDP according to the Bank of Spain’s (2020) latest 39 
figures (the third major contributor to national accounts), what means that any adverse 40 
shock on this sector may have a dramatic impact on the Spanish economy. The recent 41 
unexpected perturbation, COVID-19, took place in mid-March 2020 and is stagnating the 42 
economic activity in Spain and all over the world. In fact, the most up to date forecast of 43 
GDP growth, carried out by Funcas’ Consensus (2020), points out that a technical 44 
recession (two consecutive quarters of GDP decline) is expected in 2020, deepening the 45 
vulnerability of the economic activity. Additionally, The World Tourism Organization 46 
(UNWTO, 2020) states that Spain occupies the second position in the ranking of visited 47 
countries in the world after France and the second highest earning destination behind the 48 
US. Thus, it is important for the scientific community to analyze the impact of COVID 49 
on this sector in Spain. In order to do so, we examine whether COVID-19 will have a 50 
temporary or a permanent effect on the tourist sector in Spain. These results will help 51 
practitioners make decisions in the short and in the long run. If we expect a temporary 52 
impact, companies could put up with Coronavirus taking the appropriate safety measures, 53 
but if we expect a persistent effect, managers should radically modify the strategy and 54 
stronger measures should then have to be adopted.   55 
At the same time, getting access to daily data is so difficult in the tourism sector 56 
(mainly because figures are released monthly by the National Statistics Office), that we 57 
have decided to use as proxy variables various measures that look at the evolution of the 58 
Spanish equity markets from macroeconomic, mesoeconomic and microeconomic 59 
perspectives. To investigate the economic consequences of Coronavirus, we analyze the 60 
IBEX35 data; to assess the mesoeconomic impact, we study the Madrid Stock Exchange 61 
Leisure, Tourism and Hotel total index; and to observe the microeconomic impact, we 62 
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use the Meliá Hotel International and the Amadeus It Group stock market data, that are 63 
the only two tourism companies in the IBEX35 and therefore the most powerful 64 
enterprises in the Spanish tourism sector. Additionally, we have added the NH Hotels 65 
equity data to compare and underpin the results (this company does not belong to IBEX35 66 
but to the Madrid stock market).  67 
This note focuses on the properties of the five aforementioned stock market 68 
indices: IBEX35, Madrid SE Leisure, Tourism and Hotel total index (“Madrid SE”), 69 
Meliá Hotel International (“Meliá”), Amadeus It Group (“Amadeus It Group”) and NH 70 
Hotels (“NH Hotel”) stock market; as in many other studies on the persistence of shocks 71 
(e.g., Gil-Alana and Moreno, 2009; Lovcha and Perez-Laborda, 2018) we use fractional 72 
integration methods. The time period considered starts on 14 May 2018 and ends on 14 73 
May 2020, thus making it possible to assess the evolution of the tourism sector prior to 74 
and during the pandemic. The disease was first confirmed in Spain on 31 January 2020, 75 
when a German tourist tested positive for SARS-CoV-2 in the Canary Islands, and the 76 
lockdown was imposed on 14 March 2020. 77 
 78 
2. Data and Methodology 79 
We use daily prices data from five equity markets (IBEX35, Madrid SE Leisure, Tourism 80 
and Hotel total index, Meliá Hotel International, Amadeus It Group and NH Hotels) to 81 
assess tourism activity in Spain before and during COVID-19, from 14 May 2018 to 14 82 
May 2020. The number of observations reaches 512 and the data-source is Refinitiv Eikon 83 
(Thomson Reuters), that is a real-time financial and economic data platform.  Meliá Hotel 84 
International and Amadeus It Group belong to IBEX35 as they are the two biggest 85 
touristic companies in Spain. Additionally, we have included the NH Hotels stock market 86 
data to compare and underpin the results with the other two companies. Meliá and 87 
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Amadeus could be correlated with IBEX35 data, so that the NH variable may clarify the 88 
final outcomes.  89 
 As mentioned earlier, we use a strong dependence model based on fractional 90 
integration (I(d)) to determine the effect of shocks. Thus, if the value of d is below 1, the 91 
effect of a shock will be transitory, taking longer to disappear the higher the value of d is; 92 
on the contrary, d equal to or higher than 1 there is no reversion to the mean and 93 
permanency of shocks. Other articles dealing with fractional integration in tourism data 94 
include Assaf et al. (2011), Al-Shboul and Anwar (2017) and Gil-Alana et al. (2019). 95 
 96 
3. Results 97 
The model examined is: 98 
    
,...,1,0,)1(;t10ty ==−++= tuxLxt tt
d    (1) 99 
where yt is the observed time series (in logs);
1 β0 and β1 are unknown parameters 100 
corresponding to an intercept and a linear time trend, and xt is I(d), where d is a real value. 101 
Across Tables 1 - 4, the error term ut in (1) is white noise; in Tables 5 - 8 102 
autocorrelation is permitted by using Bloomfield (1973), and in Tables 9 – 12, ut is 103 
described in terms of a seasonal autoregression. First, we display the results with the data 104 
ending on February 23, 2020 which is the time of the first death by COVID-19 in Spain. 105 
Then, we enlarge the sample until May 14, 2020, to compare the changes due to the 106 
coronavirus crisis. 107 
Table 1: Differencing parameter in a sample ending at 23 Feb. 2020: White noise  108 
Series No det. terms An intercept A linear time trend 
Amadeus It Group 0.99    (0.93,  1.07) 0.99    (0.93,  1.06) 0.99    (0.93,  1.06) 
IBEX 35 0.98    (0.93,  1.06) 1.00    (0.93,  1.09) 1.00    (0.93,  1.09) 
Madrid SE Leisure 0.99    (0.93,  1.06) 0.98    (0.93,  1.04) 0.98    (0.93,  1.04) 
 
1 We use log prices since the first differences can then be interpreted in terms of the returns series.  
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Melia Hotel 0.98    (0.92,  1.05) 0.91    (0.85,  0.99) 0.92    (0.85,  0.99) 
NH Hotel 0.99    (0.92,  1.06) 1.00    (0.93,  1.06) 1.00    (0.93,  1.06) 
The selected specifications based on the deterministic terms are marked in bold. The values in parenthesis 109 
correspond to the 95% bands for the values of d. 110 
 111 
Table 2: Selected coefficients across Table 1 112 
Series d (95% band) Intercept (tvalue) Time trend (tvalue) 
Amadeus It Group 0.99    (0.93,  1.06) 4.1560   (295.58) --- 
IBEX 35 1.00    (0.93,  1.09) 9.2357   (1125.92) --- 
Madrid SE Leisure 0.98    (0.93,  1.04) 6.6781   (644.89) -0.0007  (-1.66) 
Melia Hotel 0.91   (0.85,  0.99)* 2.4869   (156.61) -0.0010   (-2.29) 
NH Hotel 1.00    (0.93,  1.06) 1.8382   (114.35) --- 
*: Evidence of mean reversion at the 5% level. 113 
 114 
Starting with the results based on white noise errors and looking at the data ending 115 
on February 23, 2020, we notice that the d-estimates are very close to 1 for “Amadeus It 116 
Group”, “IBEX35”,  “Madrid SE” and “NH Hotel”, where the hypothesis of a unit root 117 
cannot be rejected. However, for “Meliá”, the value of d is substantially smaller (0.92) 118 
and the I(1) hypothesis is rejected in favor of reversion to the mean. That means that a 119 
shock in the latter series, though persistent, will be a transitory nature, disappearing in the 120 
long term. We also observe negative time trend coefficients for “Madrid SE” and “Meliá” 121 
series. 122 
 If we extend the sample until May 14, 2020, the results are presented in Tables 3 123 
and 4. The time trends are once more significant for “Madrid SE” and “Meliá”, and the 124 
negative coefficients, as expected, are now higher. Surprisingly, we also observe an 125 
important increase in the order of integration in all series, especially for “Madrid SE” and 126 
“Meliá”  and “NH” (1.11, 1.07 and 1.06 respectively), where the unit root is now rejected 127 
in favor of an alternative with d higher than 1. Of particular interest is the case of “Meliá”, 128 
where d was significantly smaller than 1 prior to the crisis but became significantly higher 129 
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than 1 when including the data during the coronavirus. This indicates that the effect of 130 
the crisis has been particularly serious in this latter series, since the crisis has produced a 131 
clear change in the persistence of the series, moving from mean reversion to a lack of it. 132 
Table 3: Differencing parameter using the whole sample: White noise  133 
Series No det. Terms An intercept A linear time trend 
Amadeus It Group 0.98    (0.93,  1.05) 1.00    (0.95,  1.05) 1.00    (0.95,  1.05) 
IBEX 35 0.99    (0.93,  1.06) 1.03    (0.98,  1.09) 1.03    (0.98,  1.09) 
Madrid SE Leisure 0.99    (0.93,  1.06) 1.11    (1.06,  1.16) 1.11    (1.06,  1.16) 
Melia Hotel 0.97    (0.92,  1.04) 1.07    (1.01,  1.13) 1.07    (1.01,  1.13) 
NH Hotel 0.99    (0.93,  1.05) 1.06    (1.00,  1.12) 1.06    (1.00,  1.12) 
 134 
Table 4: Selected coefficients across Table 3 135 
Series d (95% band) Intercept (tvalue) Time trend (tvalue) 
Amadeus It Group 1.00    (0.95,  1.05) 4.1557   (191.68) --- 
IBEX 35 1.03    (0.98,  1.09) 9.2362   (651.12) --- 
Madrid SE Leisure 1.11    (1.06,  1.16) 6.6798   (375.03) -0.0022   (-1.68) 
Melia Hotel 1.07    (1.01,  1.13) 2.4908   (95.83) 
90   (95.86) 
-0.0026   (-1.75) 
NH Hotel 1.06    (1.00,  1.12) 1.8391   (67.59) --- 
 136 
As a robustness test of our results, we extend the analysis to other assumptions on 137 
the error term. To start with, we consider autocorrelation in the errors. First, with data 138 
ending on February 23, 2020, the results appear in Tables 5 and 6. Here, we observe that 139 
the I(1) hypothesis cannot be rejected in any of the series, though for “Meliá”, the upper 140 
value in the interval is precisely 1.00, being therefore close to the mean reversion case.2 141 
The estimated coefficient for the trend is now only significant for “Meliá”. The next two 142 
tables (7 and 8) refer to the complete data and we observe that, as in the previous case, 143 
 
2 Being more precise, and including an extra decimal value, the upper bound for the interval for Melia is 
0.996, therefore supporting the hypothesis of mean reversion. 
7 
 
there is a rise in the order of integration in all cases; in fact, the I(1) null is now rejected 144 
in the five series against d > 1. 145 
Table 5: Differencing parameter in a sample until 23 Feb. 2020: Bloomfield case 146 
Series No regressors An intercept A linear time trend 
Amadeus It Group 0.98    (0.89,  1.11) 1.01    (0.90,  1.15) 1.01    (0.90,  1.15) 
IBEX 35 0.97    (0.88,  1.11) 0.93    (0.81,  1.08) 0.93    (0.82,  1.08) 
Madrid SE Leisure 0.98    (0.89,  1.10) 1.08    (1.00,  1.20) 1.08    (1.00,  1.20) 
Melia Hotel 0.97    (0.88,  1.10) 0.90    (0.79,  1.00) 0.89    (0.80,  1.00) 
NH Hotel 1.01    (0.90,  1.12) 1.08    (0.99,  1.06) 1.08    (0.99,  1.06) 
 147 
Table 6: Selected coefficients across Table 5 148 
Series d (95% band) Intercept (tvalue) Time trend (tvalue) 
Amadeus It Group 1.01    (0.90,  1.15) 4.1555   (295.59) --- 
IBEX 35 0.93    (0.81,  1.08) 9.2344   (1132.74) --- 
Madrid SE Leisure 1.08    (1.00,  1.20) 6.6782   (652.50) --- 
Melia Hotel 0.89   (0.80,  1.00)* 2.4862   (157.44) -0.0010   (-2.71) 
NH Hotel 1.08    (0.99,  1.20) 1.8393   (115.43) --- 
*: Evidence of mean reversion at the 5% level. 149 
Table 7: Differencing parameter using the whole sample: Bloomfield case 150 
Series No regressors An intercept A linear time trend 
Amadeus It Group 0.97    (0.89,  1.09) 1.13    (1.04,  1.25) 1.14    (1.04,  1.25) 
IBEX 35 0.98    (0.89,  1.09) 1.25    (1.12,  1.40) 1.25    (1.12,  1.40) 
Madrid SE Leisure 0.98    (0.89,  1.08) 1.29    (1.19,  1.44) 1.29    (1.19,  1.44) 
Melia Hotel 0.95    (0.87,  1.06) 1.28    (1.13,  1.46) 1.28    (1.13,  1.46) 
NH Hotel 1.02    (0.91,  1.14) 1.21    (1.05,  1.44) 1.21    (1.05,  1.44) 
 151 
Table 8: Selected coefficients across Table 7 152 
Series d (95% band) Intercept (tvalue) Time trend (tvalue) 
Amadeus It Group 1.13    (1.04,  1.25) 4.1527   (196.33) --- 
IBEX 35 1.25    (1.12,  1.40) 9.2376   (685.84) --- 
Madrid SE Leisure 1.29    (1.19,  1.44) 6.6796   (396.44) --- 
Melia Hotel 1.28    (1.13,  1.46) 2.4922   (101.25) --- 




Finally, and based on the monthly frequency used in the data, an AR(1) seasonal 154 
model 155 
     
,t12-ttu  += u     (2)  156 
is assumed for the errors, and the results are reported in Tables 9 and 10 (with data ending 157 
at February 23, 2020), and in Tables 11 and 12 with the whole sample.  158 
Table 9: Differencing parameter in a sample until 23 Feb. 2020: Seasonal case 159 
Series No regressors An intercept A linear time trend 
Amadeus It Group 0.99    (0.93,  1.05) 0.99    (0.93,  1.07) 0.99    (0.93,  1.07) 
IBEX 35 0.99    (0.91,  1.06) 1.00    (0.93,  1.09) 1.00    (0.93,  1.09) 
Madrid SE Leisure 0.99    (0.91,  1.07) 0.98    (0.93,  1.04) 0.98    (0.93,  1.04) 
Melia Hotel 0.98    (0.93,  1.05) 0.91    (0.84,  0.99) 0.92    (0.85,  0.99) 
NH Hotel 0.93    (0.99,  1.06) 1.00    (0.95,  1.06) 1.00    (0.95,  1.06) 
 160 
Table 10: Selected coefficients across Table 9 161 
Series d (95% band) Intercept (tvalue) Time trend (tvalue) 
Amadeus It Group 0.99    (0.93,  1.07) 4.1560   (295.53) --- 
IBEX 35 1.00    (0.93,  1.09) 9.2357   (1125.87) --- 
Madrid SE Leisure 0.98    (0.93,  1.04) 6.6781   (642.94) -0.0007   (-1.65) 
Melia Hotel 0.92   (0.85,  0.99)* 2.4869   (155.75) -0.0011   (-2.28) 
NH Hotel  1.00    (0.95,  1.06) 1.8381   (114.35) --- 
*: Evidence of mean reversion at the 5% level. 162 
The results are similar to those in Tables 1 and 2. Evidence of time trends are 163 
observed for “Madrid SE” and “Melia”; the unit root hypothesis is unrejected for 164 
“Amadeus It Group”, “IBEX35”,  “Madrid SE”, and “NH”, and this hypothesis is rejected 165 
in favor of reversion to the mean for “Meliá”. Using the whole sample, there is a rise in 166 
d, which is especially remarkable in the cases of “Madrid SE”,  “Meliá” and “NH”. As in 167 
the previous cases, including COVID-19 data, there is a change in persistence, and data 168 
for “Meliá” moves from mean reversion to a lack of it.  169 
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Table 11: Differencing parameter using the whole sample: Seasonal case 170 
Series No regressors An intercept A linear time trend 
Amadeus It Group 0.98    (0.92,  1.05) 0.99    (0.94,  1.05) 0.99    (0.94,  1.05) 
IBEX 35 0.99    (0.92,  1.06) 1.03    (0.97,  1.09) 1.03    (0.98,  1.09) 
Madrid SE Leisure 0.99    (0.92,  1.06) 1.09    (1.04,  1.15) 1.09    (1.04,  1.15) 
Melia Hotel 0.97    (0.91,  1.04) 1.07    (1.01,  1.13) 1.07    (1.01,  1.13) 
NH Hotel 0.93    (0.99,  1.05) 1.07    (1.01,  1.15) 1.07    (1.01,  1.15) 
 171 
Table 12: Selected coefficients across Table 11 172 
Series d (95% band) Intercept (tvalue) Time trend (tvalue) 
Amadeus It Group 0.99    (0.94,  1.05) 4.1560   (191.33) --- 
IBEX 35 1.03    (0.97,  1.09) 9.2362   (650.15) --- 
Madrid SE Leisure 1.09    (1.04,  1.15) 6.6794   (372.9) -0.0022   (-1.65) 
Melia Hotel 1.07    (1.01,  1.13) 2.4908   (95.60) -0.0026   (-1.64) 
NH Hotel  1.07    (1.01,  1.15) 1.8392   (67.60) --- 
Values in parenthesis in the 3rd and 4th columns are t-values. 173 
 174 
4. Conclusions  175 
The impact of COVID-19 on the Spanish tourism sector has been examined in this work 176 
by using fractional integration. Our results indicate that this sanitary crisis has been 177 
particularly serious in the case of companies related to tourism, increasing the level of 178 
persistence, and moving from mean reversion (and transitory shocks) before the crisis to 179 
lack of mean reversion (with permanent shocks) during it. Thus, strong policy measures 180 
should be taken into account by the companies (and authorities) if we want to recover the 181 
original levels-trends prior to the crisis. Putting in a different way, if there is now another 182 
exogenous shock affecting the tourism series, stronger actions should be adopted to 183 
recover the original levels in the series than if that shock would have happened prior to 184 
the crisis.  One example could be observed in the recent package of measures announced 185 
10 
 
by “Meliá” in the 27th May Press Release, called Stay Safe with Meliá1, in which they 186 
present a transformation strategy based on four pillars: 1) safety for employees and 187 
customers, 2) reduced contact in interactions between customers and employees, 3) 188 
optimization of operational processes, simplifying and digitalizing the service, and 4) 189 
adaptation of the brand to new paradigms and customer needs. The new policies include 190 
extra cleaning and hygiene measures and new personal space: social distance, apart from 191 
a new and more flexible cancellation policy.   192 
 193 
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